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C H A P T E R S E V E N
The Political Repression of a Chicano Movement
Activist: The Plight of Francisco E. “Kiko” Martínez1
James Barrera, South Texas College
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the U.S. government
attempted to covertly subdue the progressive activity of numerous social
justice and civil rights movements in our society. One of the govern-
ment’s key objectives in this activity involved the political repression of
certain leaders of these movements, including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
(Black Civil Rights Movement), Malcolm X (Black Nationalist Movement),
and Russell Means (American Indian Movement).
Leaders of the Chicano Movement were also among the government’s
most scrutinized and pursued “political targets” during this era that
spanned through the 1960s and well into the 1970s. For example,
Rodolfo “Corky” González, Reies López Tijerina, César Chávez, Dolores
Huerta, and José Angel Gutiérrez were targeted for their involvement in
movements that advocated for social change, economic justice, and politi-
cal equality. They often experienced harassment, arrest, and incarceration
by federal, state, and local law enforcement officials for their role and
participation in civil rights protest activity that was constitutionally pro-
tected.2 Sometimes, government officials went as far as to resort to unlaw-
ful modes of repression to falsely implicate and imprison activists because
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of their supposed threat to American democracy and its status quo, and
for allegedly having ties to the Communist Party.3 Another lesser-known
movement participant who merits particular attention and recognition is
Francisco E. “Kiko” Martínez, a Chicano activist attorney from the south-
ern Colorado city of Alamosa.
C O I N T E L P R O
Before analyzing the major events of Martínez’s life as a “political target,”
we must better understand the FBI’s counter-intelligence program known
as COINTELPRO. This program, initiated in 1956 by then-FBI Director J.
Edgar Hoover, was organized to identify and incriminate American
Communist Party activists and their supporters. Although FBI officials
had often “disrupted” the activities of suspected radical groups since the
early 1940s, the creation of COINTELPRO represented a formal program
based on written protocol that permitted the use of extralegal methods
against those perceived as dissident rabble-rousers or “un-American.”4
COINTELPRO was a product of the ostensible “Age of McCarthyism,”
which was fueled by the anti-communist hysteria that swept the nation
during the 1950s.
Hoover summarizes COINTELPRO’s original goal to eradicate communist
ties in America:
The forces which are most anxious to weaken our internal security are
not always easy to identify. Communists have been trained in deceit
and secretly work toward the day when they hope to replace our
American way of life with a Communist dictatorship. They utilize
cleverly camouflaged movements, such as peace groups and civil
rights groups to achieve their sinister purposes. While they as individ-
uals are difficult to identify, the Communist party line is clear. Its first
concern is the advancement of Soviet Russia and the godless
Communist cause. It is important to learn to know the enemies of the
American way of life.5
By adhering to this theory, Hoover believed all social movements discreet-
ly advocated the spread of communism in the United States during the
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mid-twentieth century. However, the FBI has yet to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that communist ties existed with any civil rights and anti-
war groups. During the 1960s Civil Rights Movement and countercul-
ture era, COINTELPRO’s main objective was “to expose, disrupt, misdi-
rect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the enemies of the State.”6 This pur-
pose was achieved in large part by imprisoning movement activists who
were “criminalized” through false charges, frame-ups, and slanderous
publications printed in their names.7 According to legal analyst Brian
Glick, one of the four methods of COINTELPRO-type political repression
employed by both the FBI and police included the exploitation of the
judicial system to wrongfully incarcerate dissidents.8 Examining Martínez
as a movement activist who experienced governmental persecution is a
case in point.
K I K O M A R T Í N E Z A S
P O L I T I C A L T A R G E T
Prior to facing political repression in 1973, Martínez represented numer-
ous Chicano clients, including students, prison inmates, and workers. In
essence, his clients were most often those who could not afford to hire
legal assistance. Most likely, however, FBI officials targeted Martinez for
COINTELPRO surveillance and repression for his participation in
Chicano movement activities and for his outspoken criticism of
Colorado’s state penitentiary system.9 In addition, Colorado’s varied crimi-
nal justice agencies, with the help of the FBI, probably used the mass
media to aid in a campaign that worked to undermine Martínez’ social
justice activities. Fearing capture and unjust imprisonment, Martínez
exiled himself to Mexico in order to protect himself from state-initiated
threats to his freedom and life. Seven years later in 1980, Martínez
returned to the U.S. to proclaim his innocence to the criminal charges
and refute both federal and state government’s criminal accusations
against him.
Because of the above, I argue that Francisco E. Martínez can be catego-
rized as a “political target.” I define a political target as one selected by the
federal government “for criminal persecution because of their political
activity, when they [government officials] can fabricate evidence against
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that person and suppress evidence proving that fabrication, and prosecute
a person(s) and put them in prison for any amount of time, including for
life.”10 A brief discussion of Martínez’ background will shed light on why
he became a political target. I then discuss in more detail the events that
local and state criminal justice and legal officials manipulated in order to
aid COINTELPRO agents in the villification of Martínez, and which served
to justify the unwarranted repression he endured. I specifically review a
key court case brought against Martínez to highlight the cumulative and
disadvantageous legal ramifications it had in later legal machinations by
local, state, and federal law enforcement and legal representatives.
K I K O M A R T Í N E Z B A C K G R O U N D
Francisco Eugenio “Kiko” Martínez was born on November 26, 1946 in
Alamosa, Colorado to Mr. and Mrs. José Martínez. He graduated from
Alamosa High School in 1964. In 1966, Martínez joined and supported the
activities of the Crusade for Justice, a Chicano social justice organization
founded by Rodolfo “Corky” González in Denver, Colorado.11 He attended
Adams State College in Alamosa where he studied anthropology, sociology,
and business administration, and graduated in 1968. In 1970, Martínez
served as an intern at Salud y Justicia (Health and Justice), an agency that
provided legal, health, and social work assistance for agricultural workers.
Throughout his college and law school years, Martínez began training for a
life-long career in providing legal services in civil law to underprivileged
ethnic Mexican communities, migrant farmworkers, Chicano university stu-
dents, and families. Martínez’s childhood and adolescent years as a migrant
worker and student enabled him to understand the adverse circumstances
faced by these people in society, which influenced him to pursue a career as
a lawyer to assist them in civil cases.12 As a young man, Martínez became a
product of the Chicano Movement, which promoted the political and civil
rights of ethnic Mexican people.
In 1971, he enrolled at the University of Minnesota’s School of Law where
he emerged as a strong advocate for prison inmates and Native American
and Chicano legal rights. During his early years as an attorney in the
1970s, Martínez often represented and counseled Chicano inmates at the
Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City and members of the United
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Mexican American Students (UMAS) organization at the University of
Colorado—Boulder. Additionally, Martínez defended numerous individu-
als charged with crimes in Colorado and New Mexico.13
Martínez first gained attention for expressing his discontent with the crim-
inal justice system when refusing to answer one question on the Colorado
state bar exam after finishing law school in 1971. He contended that this
question was offensive and demeaning to Native Americans. According to
Martínez, such a question characterized Native Americans as “squaws,”
like in the movie Little Big Man, which offered an inaccurate and false
portrayal of native peoples’ culture in America.14 He and American Indian
Movement activists opposed the inclusion of the question on the state bar
exam by protesting outside the Supreme Court of Colorado in October
1971. However, this protest did not actually lead to the disallowance of
the question at the time. Martinez’s refusal to respond to the question rep-
resents his opposition to the use of racial stereotypes of Native Americans
not only on state bar exams, but in the U.S. legal system. Despite
Martínez’s refusal to answer this question in order to protest its inclusion
on the bar exam, he passed and received his law license.15
In the early 1970s, Martínez joined the Crusade for Justice, formed by
renowned Chicano Movement leader Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzalez. Martínez
spoke out against the adverse conditions faced by Mexican American
prison inmates in the Colorado penal system. Prior to completing law
school, Martínez participated in summer internships and worked under
Jonathan B. Chase in the Colorado Rural Legal Services. This type of work
experience helped him learn about the types of mistreatment against
Chicano prisoners. Martínez recalled that certain inmates reported to him
that various prison officials routinely whipped them without provocation.
In 1971, Martínez organized the Latin American Development Society in
the Colorado prison system in response to such mistreatment and to
assist inmates in the forming of a self-help group. This group represent-
ed Martínez’s call for reform of the state prison system. He also ques-
tioned prison officials about why Chicanos comprised fifty percent of all
incarcerated persons in the state penitentiaries. Consequently, prison
administrators regarded his argument as insignificant and made very little
effort, if any, to prevent the abuse of Chicano inmates.16
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Because of his continued involvement with the Crusade for Justice while
gaining educational and professional credentials and practicing as a
lawyer, Kiko Martínez became a prime target for law enforcement surveil-
lance during the early to mid-1970s. His part in the controversial Ricardo
Falcón murder case served to arouse further suspicion for him. His status
as a political target became solidified with his alleged roles in attempted
Denver city bombings.
M A R T Í N E Z ’ S W O R K I N T H E
R I C A R D O F A L C Ó N M U R D E R C A S E
While active in the La Raza Legal Association and the Mexican American
Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) in 1972, Martínez served
and testified in the famous murder trial of Chicano activist and school
teacher Ricardo Falcón. The murder occurred while Ricardo Falcón and a
small group of his peers, including Martinez, were traveling from Fort
Lupton, Colorado to the national convention for the La Raza Unida inde-
pendent political party in El Paso, Texas on August 30, 1972. The controver-
sy surrounding Falcón’s murder attracted much attention from the Chicano
community both in Colorado and at the national level. Martínez became
closely involved in the case in order to positively identify Falcón’s murderer.
The murder occurred shortly after the group had stopped at an
Orogrande, New Mexico gas station when their car overheated. An argu-
ment developed when gas station owner Perry Brunson refused car driver
Florencio Granado’s request to water down the car while the gas tank was
filling. In fact, Brunson’s response to Granado’s request was, “We don’t
waste water around here. It’s expensive.” Falcón took offense to the
reply and involved himself in the argument between Brunson and
Granado. Upon Brunson’s return to the station office, Falcón suspected
that Brunson had a gun and asked if he did so. Brunson sarcastically
remarked, “Come over here and find out.” Falcón complied and shortly
after entering the station office, gunfire rang out leaving Falcón dead from
a wound suffered by a 38 police special pistol.
Immediately after the shooting occurred, Falcón’s companions went to
businesses nearby in an attempt to telephone the shooting to the local
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police. They were refused service. However, police arrived at the scene
minutes after the shooting upon receiving a telephone call from Brunson.
An ambulance finally arrived an hour after Falcón was shot. After police
apprehended and detained Brunson for a short period of time, Robert
Bradley, local magistrate and Brunson’s personal friend, released him on
his own recognizance.17
The news of Falcón’s murder became widespread, and prompted many in
the Chicano community to speak out against Brunson, the prime suspect
of the shooting. Among them was South Dakota Senator George
McGovern who denounced Brunson’s action as “an act of insanity.”18 He
further remarked, “I am shocked at the killing of young Richard Falcón. I
assure you of my efforts to see that justice is done in this act of insanity. I
am contacting the U.S. attorney general to see that immediate action be
taken to initiate investigative proceedings.”19 However, McGovern later
retracted his statement after requested to do so by Brunson’s lawyer, Albert
J. Rivera. Rivera made the request “in the interest of fair play,” implying
that Brunson was innocent of the murder charge until proven guilty.20
Raza Unida Party convention organizers expressed their outrage over the
incident upon hearing about Falcon’s tragic death. In a telegram to
President Richard Nixon and attorney general Richard Kleindienst, they
demanded a federal investigation into the murder, which stated in part:
Cannot an American citizen obtain emergency services in American
cities, on American roads without fear for his life? Cannot a Chicano
attend a political convention without fear or loss of his life? The
National Office of the Raza Unida Party and all state delegates present
hereby demand immediate investigation of this wanton, racist murder.
The Perry Brunsons of America must be brought to justice.21
Shortly after Falcón’s death, Kiko Martínez and fellow Colorado attorney
Kenneth Padilla investigated the incident to suggest a possible course of
legal action. They also served as the spokesmen for Falcón’s widow,
Priscilla. Their work was instrumental in bringing forth a criminal
manslaughter case against Brunson in December of 1972. The trial, held
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in Alamogordo, New Mexico, came to a surprising and stunning end after
two days when Brunson was acquitted of the manslaughter charge.
Chicano activists and members of Falcón’s family were not present when
the verdict had been announced due to supposedly jury selection pro-
ceedings for another trial taking place in the same courtroom.22 Martínez
and Padilla could not attend the verdict hearing as well since police had
escorted them from the courtroom. These actions provoked an alterca-
tion between the lawyers and police with one officer shoving Martínez
down the courtroom stairs.23
Because Martínez actually challenged the American legal system that
unjustly allowed for violence to be perpetrated against Chicano activists,
COINTELPRO tactics were soon put into place against him. He quickly
became singled out by the media for his activist work and rebellious
lawyering in the Brunson manslaughter trial. He was also scrutinized for
acting “as an informal spokesman for Mrs. Priscilla Falcón during the trial
of a man accused of manslaughter in connection with the shooting death
of her husband, Richard.”24 From here on, federal officials began to close-
ly study Martinez’ activities.
T H E B E G I N N I N G O F M A R T Í N E Z ’ S
P O L I T I C A L R E P R E S S I O N
Martínez first experienced unjust political repression while attending a
Chicano and Native American Unity conference in Scottsbluff, Nebraska.
The conference was held to address social and political issues concerning
racial prejudice against Chicana/o and Native American residents in the
local area. The incident occurred on January 15, 1973, when Scottsbluff
law enforcement officials stopped the car that Martínez and a friend,
Francisco Luevano, were driving. Police officers immediately conducted a
search of the car, and later arrested Martínez and Luevano on the charge of
possessing an explosive device for what police believed was a Molotov
cocktail in the car’s backseat. According to Martínez, police charged him
with the possession of an improvised explosive device.25 Moreover, he
asserted that police justified their search of the vehicle based on police
finding old rags that smelled of gasoline in the truck of the car.
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Both Martínez and Luevano were tried before the Nebraska Supreme
Court on this federal criminal charge, and were found “not guilty” since
the police search and seizure was declared unconstitutional as it violated
the Fourth Amendment.26 Martínez’ trumped up arrest and subsequent
trial were indicative of law enforcement tactics that were carried out in an
attempt to neutralize Martínez’ social justice agenda.27 This incident pos-
sibly represents federal law enforcement’s initial effort to persecute him
via the legal system. Martínez believes the judge suppressed evidence and
that the police had no reasonable cause to search the automobile.28
D E N V E R B O M B H Y S T E R I A
In October 1973, government officials bolstered their efforts to repress
Martínez by attempting to indict him in Denver, Colorado on trumped-
up criminal charges. The charges included the mailing of three package-
box size bombs to African American policewoman Carol Hogue, to local
school board member Robert Crider, and to the Two Wheeler Motorcycle
Shop. This came during a time when numerous criminal allegations were
being leveled by the Denver police against those involved in the Crusade
for Justice organization.29 In particular, they alleged that members of the
Crusade for Justice were responsible for making and strategically planting
homemade bombs throughout numerous locations in the city as a means
to violently carry out their social justice agenda. These allegations deeply
implicated key Crusade for Justice members in the “bomb hysteria” that
swept Denver and Boulder, Colorado throughout the early 1970s.30
There is little doubt that real hostilities existed between the police and the
Crusade for Justice and worked to exacerbate perceived and real injustices.
For example, Denver law enforcement officers killed a Crusade for Justice
activist during a violent confrontation that ensued outside the organization’s
headquarters in 1973.31 It was during this turbulent period that Denver
policewoman Carol Hogue, who was involved in the shootout, alleged that
Martínez sent her a bomb in the mail. Shortly thereafter, Robert
Shaughnessy, head of the Denver Police Bomb Squad, confirmed this alle-
gation and another allegation of Martínez’ attempt to bomb the Two
Wheeler Motorcycle Shop in north Denver.32 These allegations resulted in
criminal charges and an indictment being brought forth against Martínez.33
NACCS_FINAL:NACCS proceedings  3/18/09  4:10 PM  Page 125
126
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CHICANA AND CHICANO STUDIES
Probably two of the most well-publicized and tragic incidents, however,
were two car bombings that took place in Boulder in May of 1974 and
claimed the lives of six young Chicano activists. The first car bombing
claimed the life of Kiko’s 25 year-old brother, Reyes Martínez, along with
21 year-old Neva Romero and 23 year-old Una Jaakola. Two days later a
second car bombing took the lives of Florencio Granado, 32, Heriberto
Teran, 24, and Francisco Dougherty, 22. Crusade for Justice activists
believed that those who died in the explosions were victims of police and
governmental conspiracies intended to neutralize their social justice activ-
ities. Furthermore, the subsequent investigation into the six deaths was
perceived more as a means of identifying Colorado’s Chicano activists’
network than an attempt to bring the perpetrators to justice, as various
family members and friends of the blast victims were later subpoenaed
for investigation by federal authorities.34
Adding to the hysteria were bomb explosions the following year that
occurred at Boulder’s Flatiron Elementary School, the Colorado
University Police Department building, and at the Hall of Justice on
Boulder’s Courthouse Square.35 These incidents were blamed on Crusade
for Justice activists. In 1975, the Crusade for Justice was once again sin-
gled out for the placement of a bomb at the meeting location of the
International Association of Chiefs of Police in Denver.36
P O L I T I C A L E X I L E A N D R E T U R N
Strangely, none of the bombs that Martínez allegedly mailed exploded
since law enforcement officials “miraculously” arrived just before they
went off. Shortly after his indictment, Martínez’ license to practice law in
Colorado was suspended. The Denver Post, and the federal government
offered a reward of up to $3,000 for information leading to Martínez’
arrest. Law enforcement officials first attempted to apprehend him in
Denver. However, Martínez managed to elude capture when he and a
female friend were driving to their apartment complex.
It was while en route to the apartment complex when they both heard
the news report on their car radio that police had unsuccessfully raided
two homes in order to try to take him into custody.37 The report further
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indicated that Martínez was presumed armed and dangerous. Upon
hearing this radio news report, Martínez believed it was a form of intimi-
dation that intended to create widespread hysteria since the police were
eager to arrest him.38 Moreover, Martínez feared an assassination attempt
on his life by police who were instructed to shoot him “on sight,” under-
scoring the COINTELPRO technique of sanctioned use of extralegal force
or violence.39 Concerned for his safety and wanting to avoid a violent
confrontation with police, Martínez left the country for Mexico where he
went into exile for seven years.
On September 3, 1980 Martínez attempted to return to the U.S. by cross-
ing the border illegally at Nogales, Arizona under the alias of José
Reynoso Díaz.40 He used the alias in order to prevent border agents from
extraditing him to Colorado if apprehended. His plan almost worked as
U.S. Border Patrol agents were unaware that he was “wanted’ by Colorado
law enforcement officials when he was eventually apprehended, taken
into custody, and charged with entering the U.S. illegally and failing to
prove citizenship. They became suspicious, however, after discovering a
journal in his backpack documenting his childhood years in Alamosa.41
In seeking to verify Martínez’ identity, officials gave his picture to an army
captain at nearby Fort Huachuca who planned to attend an FBI-spon-
sored conference in Denver, Colorado. At this conference, a Colorado
Bureau of Investigation agent positively identified Martínez after seeing
the picture.42 His identity was verified just before officials were ready to
deport him back to Mexico. One official involved in the case expressed
relief after receiving confirmation regarding Martínez’s identity saying, “In
another 24 hours, we would have lost him.”43
Martínez now faced a formidable challenge both in federal and state
courts to avoid incarceration on what seemed to be fabricated charges
based on circumstantial evidence. What’s more, the mobilization of bias
against Martínez began almost immediately. To illustrate, a local TV news
report suggested that Martínez “fled [to Mexico] to avoid prosecution and
remained a fugitive until his recent arrest on the Arizona-Mexico bor-
der.”44 Another TV news report in Denver announced, “Exactly where
Martínez spent the last seven years isn’t known but there’s some specula-
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tion that he was in Cuba.”45 A newspaper report similarly echoed that he
traveled to Cuba at one time during his exile in Mexico.46 Altogether, the
media coverage portrayed Martínez as a treacherous political dissident,
which worked against him in court proceedings. Once again, this strate-
gy portrays effective methods that were put into place by COINTELPRO
operatives.47
M A R T Í N E Z G O E S O N T R I A L
Martínez’s long and arduous quest to prove his innocence of the charges
brought against him began in the fall of 1980. A grand jury recommend-
ed his bond be set at $150,000, but U.S. District Judge Fred M. Winner
decided to set the bond at $1 million. Kenneth Padilla, Martínez’ attor-
ney, argued that the bond was “almost ransom” and more so a denial of
bail.48 This argument proved successful as Judge Winner later reduced the
bond to $400,000 for the federal charges.49 In addition, federal prosecu-
tor John Barksdale could not present substantial evidence that merited a
$1 million bond. In fact, Barksdale admitted that no credible evidence
was presented on the issue.
Even so, Barksdale believed that the court should take into account infor-
mation from newspaper articles revealing that Martínez’ fingerprints were
discovered on the bombs.50 Judge Winner disagreed with Barksdale, con-
tending that the newspaper articles were not admissible proof suggesting
Martínez’ guilt or innocence. Judge Winner went on to state:
If I ever read any such newspaper stories, I don’t remember them, but
I couldn’t disagree more with the government’s claim that a man
should be deprived of his liberty on the basis of newspaper stories
when the government, for reasons best known to it, elected to present
no evidence suggesting the defendant’s guilt. This argument of the
prosecution I emphatically and unqualifiedly reject. Unsworn newspa-
per reports do not do away with the presumption of innocence appli-
cable to all defendants. If I ever rule based on newspaper accounts, I
hope it’s my last day on the bench.51
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In any case, a few of Martínez’ family members and close friends posted
their sixteen homes as bail for the $400,000 bond, expressing their confi-
dence that he would not flee the city after his release. The court accepted
the properties as sufficient bail payment, and Martínez was released to
the custody of his attorney Kenneth Padilla on October 24, 1980.
As various court rulings went on, it appeared more and more that local,
state, and federal law enforcement and legal officials were conspiring to
falsely imprison Martínez. During a preliminary hearing before Chief
Denver County Court Judge George Manerbino, state prosecutors
requested to submit as evidence fingerprint records of Martínez taken by
local law enforcement officers who unlawfully arrested him in Scottsbluff,
Nebraska in 1973. Kenneth Padilla argued that the court dismiss such
evidence since Martínez’ arrest in Nebraska was ruled unconstitutional,
and told Manerbino to give “full faith and credit” to the findings of the
Nebraska courts and discount the fingerprint record.52 However, Deputy
Denver District Attorney and Prosecutor Cass García refuted Padilla’s con-
tention and maintained that Manerbino was not bound by the Nebraska
rulings since only a district court judge has the authority to dismiss fin-
gerprint evidence.53 Thus, Manerbino allowed prosecutors to submit the
fingerprint record as admissible evidence in the case against Martínez.
Additionally, law enforcement ineptitude reinforced conspiratorial notions
concerning Martinez’ trial. The Denver police reported in November of
1980 that they had lost the bomb that Martínez allegedly sent to local
school board member Robert Crider in 1973.54 Denver Bomb Squad Head
Robert Shaughnessy, embarrassed and baffled about the missing bomb,
testified that custodial personnel apparently discarded the evidence.55
This misfortune impacted the federal cases against Martínez as federal
prosecutors could not convince the court that there was a pattern of
deviant, malicious behavior without the evidence.
M A R T Í N E Z ’ S F I R S T F E D E R A L
( M I S ) T R I A L
U.S. District Judge Fred M. Winner scheduled Martínez’ first federal trial
for January 27, 1981 in Pueblo, Colorado. Unfortunately, Winner
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ordered separate trials for each of Martínez’ three bombing charges.56 The
January 27 trial was centered on the 1973 attempted mail bombing of
Denver policewoman Carol Hogue. Before the trial began, Martínez’
attempt to have the case dismissed due to local bias towards him and vin-
dictive prosecution was denied by Judge Winner.57 Also to no avail,
Kenneth Padilla called for a mistrial since federal prosecutors dismissed
all potential jurors of Hispanic descent.58 Luckily, both plaintiffs and
defendant’s attorneys agreed to disallow any reference to the case involv-
ing Martínez’ 1973 arrest in Nebraska.59
During the trial’s opening statement, Los Angeles defense attorney
Leonard Weinglass, renowned for his work in various trials involving
political activists, offered an explanation as to why police claimed to have
found Martínez’ fingerprints on the bomb package sent to policewoman
Carol Hogue. He argued that the fingerprints actually came from a piece
of poster board where he did legal work at the University of Colorado,
Boulder.60 However, federal prosecutors wanted to use the print evidence
against Martínez and offered their interpretation concerning such evi-
dence. One legal document filed by the prosecutors’ states:
The Government intends to use evidence that the defendant’s finger-
prints were recovered from newspapers surrounding dynamite near
Alamosa, Colorado, in 1972, and that the defendant was arrested in
Scottsbluff, Nebraska, driving a car in which was recovered a Molotov
cocktail to establish proof of a motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident as
to the crimes charged in the indictment.61
The use of the fingerprint evidence was an issue of contention for both
sides throughout the trial.
C O N T R O V E R S Y L E A D I N G
T O M I S T R I A L E N S U E S
During another moment in the Hogue trial, jury members Jacquelyne
Wolfe and Charles Kelly approached Judge Winner to complain to him
about t-shirts worn by certain members of the audience in the courtroom
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that stated on the front side, “Free Kiko.” Defense Attorney Weinglass
requested a mistrial on the basis that the two jurors’ complaint reveals “the
anger the jurors are feeling towards the defendant.”62 After hearing all argu-
ments on the issue, Judge Winner informed the two jurors that he could
not tell audience members how to dress in the courtroom, and cautioned
them not to reach a verdict based on the type of clothing worn by specta-
tors.63 This would not be the case in subsequent trials as Judge Winner
claimed he wanted to “prevent clothing which could be construed as intim-
idating to the jury” and the “wearing of clothing containing printing which
may be interpreted as attempted communication with the jury.”64
In a similar vein, however, the two jurors also complained to Judge
Winner that one member of the defense team wore dark sunglasses dur-
ing the court proceedings. They viewed this as suspicious and inappro-
priate. Kenneth Padilla believed the jurors’ comments were uncalled for
and pointed at apparent “prejudice toward Mr. Martínez.”65 The trial did
come to a surprising end when Judge Winner granted a mistrial at the
request of federal prosecutors and not by the defense as requested
earlier.66 Judge Winner did reveal that the mistrial motion would be
granted only if the defense joined in on the motion. This gave prosecu-
tors another opportunity to file the same type of charges against Martínez
without constituting “double jeopardy.”67
Defense attorneys offered their interpretations as to why the mistrial
occurred. Kenneth Padilla stated, “Their (federal prosecutors’) case was
going badly for them and they wanted to extricate themselves from a bad
case.”68 Padilla further believed that prosecutors called for the mistrial
fearing that Martínez might win the case on appeal if found guilty
because of the two jurors’ complaints against him.69 Defense Attorney
Leonard Weinglass alleged that the U.S. attorney’s office decided that the
case was a “no-win” situation according to what they read in the newspa-
pers.70 On the other hand, the media offered an inaccurate interpretation
of why Judge Winner reluctantly granted the mistrial. They reported that
the mistrial motion was granted at the request of the defense rather than
by the prosecution. Indeed, a Denver television news report announced
that “U.S. District Judge Fred Winner granted the defense request for a
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mistrial on the grounds that two jurors have shown ‘hostility’ toward
Martínez.”71
Although a mistrial was not the same as an acquittal, it did boost the
confidence and optimism of the defense team. The defense felt that the
prosecutors’ request for a mistrial represented a moral victory in the gov-
ernment’s war of repression against Martínez. In expressing his sentiment
about the mistrial, Wineglass summed up his assessment of the mistrial
stating, “We didn’t have absolute confidence in this jury, but what ulti-
mately happened was that the government had even less confidence in
their case. This was the first time the government has been stopped (in
the Martínez cases) since 1973. I think the tide (momentum in court) is
reversed.”72 In expressing his sentiment about the mistrial, Martínez
remarked, “This is just a partial victory—the final victory will be ours
(Chicano people).”73 Additional controversy and scrutiny continued to
mar the court’s proceedings when a startling discovery was made about
Judge Fred Winner.
C O N S P I R A C Y A G A I N S T M A R T Í N E Z
I N T H E C O U R T R O O M R E V E A L E D
Unbeknownst to most participants and the public during the Hogue mis-
trial was that Judge Winner had agreed to have a hidden camera installed
in the courtroom at the behest of the FBI. Two days after the trial had
started, Judge Winner secretly met in his hotel room with the FBI, three
deputy U.S. Marshals, federal prosecutors, Denver police officials, the
court clerk, and his personal secretary to arrange the method for
installing the camera. Defense attorneys representing Martínez were not
informed of the private meeting and according to a letter written by
Winner: “The defendant and his attorneys couldn’t have been intimidated
because they wouldn’t have known (about the secret camera). I thought I
had a duty to do exactly this (place the hidden camera in the courtroom)
if the federal courts are to survive.”74 Winner later further revealed his
negative bias towards Martínez by elaborating as to why he cooperated
with FBI officials to place a camera in the courtroom, stating:
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The aborted trial was a disaster. Attempted jury intimidation was
apparent to everyone. A juror doesn’t have to be very perceptive to
understand having a group of spectators (court audience) glare at him
and having one or more of them run a finger across his throat to
threaten a slashed juror’s throat. Yet, to prove that conduct in the
future is less than easy. Persons of national notoriety attended the
trial and it is evident that the defense is well financed. If there is
acquittal, efforts to intimidate future juries throughout the United
States will accelerate…I saw what was going on, and I talked to the
marshals who saw and were worried. I notified the FBI and I author-
ized the FBI to install a concealed camera which would provide the
evidence to convict in a future obstruction of justice case.75
These dubious legal machinations indicate that an unraveling plot to
thwart the defense attorneys’ strategies in the case was the reason that a
mistrial in the case occurred. Another document filed by defense attor-
neys further reveals that Judge Winner told U.S. Attorney Barksdale that
he would grant a motion for a mistrial whenever Barksdale requested.
Moreover, Judge Winner advised federal prosecutor Barksdale to wait to
motion for a mistrial until defense attorneys had presented their case
strategy.76 Furthermore, Judge Winner reportedly told another federal
attorney that he wanted to prolong the mistrial ruling in order to have an
opportunity to obtain obstruction of justice evidence for the prosecu-
tion.77 Upon becoming aware of the hidden camera and secret meeting
first reported in the Denver Post and Rocky Mountain News, defense attor-
neys argued that Judge Winner’s actions negated any possibility that
Martínez could receive a fair trial.78 They contended that key trial wit-
nesses who attended the secret meeting on January 29 had their “sense of
right and justice” significantly influenced by Judge Winner.79
The court record also reveals another bizarre occurrence regarding
Winner’s behavior in a Pueblo, Colorado bar. Shortly after Winner
declared the Hogue attempted bombing proceedings a mistrial, he report-
edly was seen wearing a “Free Kiko” t-shirt under his sport coat while
meeting socially with various court personnel and U.S. Marshals.80 The
controversial and turbulent events associated with Martínez’s mistrial
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both in and out of the courtroom portrays the type of overzealous and
vindictive prosecution he endured from federal government prosecutors
and law enforcement agencies during the eight other court trials he later
faced throughout the 1980s to prove his innocence.
C O N C L U S I O N : F R A N C I S C O “ K I K O ”
M A R T Í N E Z ’ S H I S T O R I C A L L E G A C Y
Shortly after the 1980 mistrial, Judge Winner removed himself from
future court proceedings involving Kiko Martínez. U.S. District Judge
Luther Eubanks from Oklahoma was appointed to hear motions to dis-
miss the three attempted bombing charges filed against Martínez. During
1981, the United States of America v. Franke Eugenio Martinez federal
case pertaining to Carol Hogue was dismissed because of Judge Winner’s
secret dealings to gain a tactical advantage in future court proceedings.
“Winnergate,” as the legal scandal committed by the government against
Martínez came to be known, led to all state charges in Colorado being
dismissed in September 1981. In December of the same year, a special
federal appeals court panel ruled that Judge Winner acted improperly
during the Hogue attempted bombing case.81 Later court cases involving
Martínez took place outside of Colorado since many of the U.S. district
court and appellate judges in Colorado admitted that they had a close
association with Judge Winner.82
The dismissal of the Colorado state charges left only two federal cases
against Martínez dealing with the attempted bombings of Denver school
board member Robert Crider and the Two Wheeler Motorcycle Shop.83 In
March 1982, the government appealed a second time for permission to
use evidence from the 1981 mistrial and call for an investigation to ascer-
tain what happened to Martínez during his exile in Mexico (1973-1980).
He subsequently won this appeal. Martínez achieved an important legal
victory in federal court in November 1982 when the jury found him “not
guilty” of the government’s charges that he mailed a bomb to the Two
Wheeler Motorcycle Shop. On August 15, 1983, the rest of the federal
case against Martínez was dismissed and the government appealed for a
third time. The government eventually dismissed the case due to incon-
clusive evidence against him.
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Only six weeks after federal prosecutors failed to convict Martínez on any
of the 1973 charges, federal persecution against him began anew. FBI
agents armed with machine guns arrested him outside his home in
Alamosa without warning and accused him of giving false information to
officials at the Arizona-Mexico border when using the alias “Jose Reynoso
Diaz” while attempting to cross the border in 1980.84 In 1986, U.S.
District Judge William Browning ordered Martínez to serve ninety days of
a five-year prison sentence for concealing his true identity when crossing
the border.85 Martínez successfully appealed the conviction regarding his
use of an alias when the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Arizona
ruled by a vote of 2-1 that the use of an assumed name did not constitute
perjury.86 With this victory, the government’s political repression against
him ended. In assessing what he had endured in the courtroom against
federal and state prosecution, Martínez commented, “It’s been a heck of a
good education about the legal process and about political repression in
America.”87
In sum, Francisco “Kiko” Martínez’ plight in proving his innocence in
court reveals the type of the tactics orchestrated by local, state, and feder-
al officials against social movement activists of the modern Civil Rights
era (1960s – 1970s). Martínez became a government political target due
to his Chicano Movement ties and leftist political views that were often
expressed through his community and legal work. The evidence suggests
the manner in which government authorities prosecuted Martínez, which
fits the pattern of political persecution experienced by other more well-
known movement activists of the 1960s and 1970s. What’s more, it
appears that legal authorities likely went as far as to falsify evidence
against Martínez to imprison him indefinitely. One major actor instigat-
ing such political repression possibly includes the FBI counter-intelli-
gence program known as COINTELPRO, which had been widely active
and in full operation from the mid-1950s until 1971. Examining
Martínez as a target of governmental persecution highlights the impor-
tance of his social justice and political activism since the early 1970s. His
work in advocating the political, civil and human rights of the ethnic
Mexican and Latino communities that began at that time continues today.
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